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Introduction 
Earnings management (EM) has been a major concern for most organisations for several 
decades. One reason for this increased attention to EM is because it is conducted within 
the bounds of regulation and moreover excessive EM could lead to fraudulent activities. 
Second, and more importantly, measuring EM has been problematic. There are instances 
of similar models indicating conflicting results (Hribar & Nichols 2007) and there are 
different models available to researchers, without any analysis to indicate why different 
models give differing results. 
The ontological and epistemological views guide the development of models to 
detect instances of EM in business entities. The ontological view predominantly guides 
the qualitative approach and the epistemological view guides the quantitative approach. 
This paper compares two different approaches, one based on ontology and one based on 
epistemology, to determine EM practice in two state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 
publicly listed companies. The quantitative model, Performance-matched discretionary 
accrual (PMDA), primarily focuses on detecting accrual management, while the 
qualitative measure (Mulford & Comiskey 2002), is a more comprehensive approach 
which incorporates other forms of EM, such as classification shifting and real activity 
management. The results suggest that the measurement of EM across both the models is 
not consistent. 
A recent study (Naidu, Patel & Prasad 2009) provides results that indicate 
differences in the outcome of the two EM models (Modified Jones Model (MJM) to 
compute discretionary accruals (DAC) and Mulford and Comiskey (2002) model (MCM) 
as a qualitative measure) for an electricity utility. This study uses the PMDA model 
developed by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) as a quantitative measure and MCM as 
a qualitative approach to compare EM in both SOEs and private entities. Kothari et al. 
(2005) conclude that the PMDA model provides a more powerful test for EM. Hence two 
SOEs, Fiji Electricity Authority (FEA) and Housing Authority (HA), and two private 
entities, Flour Mills of Fiji Limited (FMF) and Communications Fiji Limited (CFL) are 
used for the analysis. The small sample number is due to the comprehensive analysis 
required as per the qualitative measure. The outcome of this research will be useful for 
research considering EM measurement and for practitioners wanting to determine the 
level of EM in industries for policy making. 
The following section discusses the ontological and epistemological views of 
acquiring knowledge and then presents a brief overview of EM incentives in SOEs and 
private entities. This is followed by a discussion on the options available to conduct EM 
as highlighted in the literature. The next section identifies the research method and then 
the results are discussed. Finally, the paper concludes with limitations and areas of future 
research. 
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The Ontological and Epistemological Views on Earnings Management Models 
EM modelling is a process that involves human inquiry into the level of its existence in 
organisations. The study of knowledge such as research on the level of EM can be 
described from two perspectives – the epistemological and ontological views. 
Epistemology is described as “the nature of human knowledge and understanding 
that can possibly be acquired through different types of inquiry and alternative methods 
of investigation” (Hirschheim, Klein & Lyytinen 1995, p. 20). From an objectivistic 
worldview, epistemology refers to the study of knowledge through observation and 
experience. This view supports the qualitative approach to investigate the level of EM as 
it relates to the observation of annual reports and accounting practice in the organisation. 
The qualitative approach to detect EM is a comprehensive method that involves 
investigating EM on a case-by-case basis. It incorporates the three means of conducting 
EM: (1) classification shifting (Ronen & Sadan 1975a, 1975b; Barnea, Ronen & Sadan 
1975, 1976; McVay 2006; Fan et al. 2010); (2) accrual management (Jones 1991; 
Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney 1995; Kothari et al. (2005); Payne & Robb 2000); and (3) 
real activity management (Xu, Taylor & Dugan 2007; Bartov 1993; Dechow & Sloan 
1991; Bushee 1998; Herrmann, Inoue & Thomas 2003; Roychowdhury 2006). Hence the 
qualitative approach involves various types of analysis and incorporates alternative 
analysis of financial data. On the other hand, the quantitative approach is based on an 
ontological view. 
Wand and Weber (1993, p. 220) explain ontology as “a branch of philosophy 
concerned with articulating the nature and structure of the world”. An ontological view is 
a constructivistic worldview. From a constructivistic worldview, knowledge is context-
specific and varies between groups of individuals. That is, ontological constructions are 
not absolutely true (Schwandt 1994). Reality is socially constructed and not discovered. 
Social and cultural artifacts are involved in the construction process. 
The quantitative approach to detect EM is based on the construction process and 
is context specific similar to the ontological views. The quantitative approach has its 
major focus on accrual management that has been the heart of EM study (Xu et al. 2007). 
Accrual management models are constructed based on the non-discretionary accounting 
elements available within accounting standards. The models are context specific 
(McNichols & Wilson 1988; Marquardt & Wiedman 2004) and their results can vary 
between industries and countries depending on available regulations. Also, different 
individuals are expected to have different results as available regulation is broad. Hence, 
the results may not be absolutely true. Despite several issues relating to the quantitative 
model, it has been popular (Kothari et al. 2005), may be used in different contexts and 
has undergone continuous development (Healy 1985; DeAngelo 1986; Jones 1991; 
Dechow & Sloan 1991; Dechow et al. 1995; Kang & Sivaramakrishnan 1995; Guay et al. 
1996; Hribar & Collins 2002; Kothari et al. 2005). 
Recently, Kothari et al. (2005, p. 34) indicate that the Jones and MJM are “the 
most popular choices for estimating discretionary accruals even though previous research 
shows that (they) are severely misspecified when applied to stratified-random samples of 
firms”. Kothari et al. (2005, p. 35) present the limitations inherent in the two popular 
models and provide evidence that the “performance-matched discretionary accrual model 
is useful in mitigating type I errors”. 
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Thus, this study attempts to compare the two broad EM models to determine the 
degree of consistency in determining EM in organisations by comparing the PMDA 
model and the MCM. 
  
Earnings Management Incentives 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) identify two major incentives for EM. Firstly, in their view, 
practitioners and regulators are usually more concerned about capital market incentives 
for EM. Capital markets provide incentives for EM as they provide a market for trading 
shares. Shareholders and potential investors react to new financial information disclosed, 
which causes changes in the demand and supply of the corporations’ shares. Thus, this 
impacts the share price. Managers, if interested in the share price, could manage earnings 
to cause a temporary change in prices. However, in an efficient capital market, as true 
information is available, the prices will adjust to their true values but the managers would 
gain from the temporary price change. 
Second, contractual arrangements also provide incentives for EM. For example, 
bonus plans and debt covenants are based on accounting numbers such as profits. 
Therefore, managers could manipulate profits so that they are able to maximise the 
benefits from the contracts, such as a good bonus. Furthermore, Healy and Wahlen 
(1999) also indicate that regulatory incentives provide strong grounds for EM practice. 
 
Earnings Management Incentives in SOEs and Private Entities 
SOEs are formed for the purpose of providing services to the public instead of 
profit maximisation. In order to provide a reasonable quality service, the SOEs need to 
have sufficient funds and it is important to have reasonable charges for their services to 
ensure that a break-even position is maintained. Most SOEs in emerging economies are 
dependent on government support in terms of subsidies. This gives an incentive for the 
management to engage in income-decreasing EM, so that they can show losses in the 
reports to justify the subsidies. Jones (1991) provides evidence that firms defer income in 
the year of application of relief from the government. 
The purpose of private enterprises is to maximise business profit and shareholder 
wealth. Hence, unlike SOEs, private enterprises are expected to continuously increase 
profits and would thus have benchmarks. Managers could be questioned if these 
benchmarks are not met. Hence, management in private enterprises is expected to engage 
in income-increasing EM when the business performance is below the benchmark. 
According to Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) most managers find that it is vital 
to avoid losses. Moreover, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), Burgstahler (1997) and 
Degeorge et al. (1999) explain that small reported losses are unusually rare than small 
reported profits and small increases in reported earnings are unusually common than 
small declines in those earnings. 
 
Similar to capital market incentives, contract arrangements also induce EM. This 
is mostly when certain outcomes in the contract depend on accounting numbers. A 
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management compensation contract is a good example where bonus plans depend on 
earnings or share price increments. This is common for both SOEs and private 
enterprises. Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) explain that 
managers engage in income-increasing EM to improve reported earnings when actual 
earnings do not qualify for bonuses. Additionally, managers would defer accruals to 
future periods when reported earnings have reached the upper limit of the executive 
bonus package. Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) present similar work, however they 
support an income-smoothing hypothesis. Moreover, Guidry (1999) supports Healy’s 
(1985) bonus hypothesis and the study shows that managers manipulate accruals to 
maximise short-term bonuses. 
Both, private enterprises and SOEs engage in externally-sourced finance. In their 
lending contracts with firms, lenders usually have a debt covenant to restrict the firm to 
maintain certain accounting ratios or to impose limits to investing and financing 
activities. Violating this covenant could lead to serious consequences for the firm, 
including increases in interest rates, requiring additional security for the loan, or in 
extreme cases the immediate payment of the loan. In order to avoid such consequences, 
managers could be motivated to manage earnings (Beneish 2001). Prior research has 
found some evidence of EM being motivated by lending contracts (DeFond & Jiambalvo 
1994; Sweeney 1994). 
Since a firm’s share price is to some extent dependent on the firm’s earnings, 
managers are expected to engage in EM prior to equity offers such as Initial Public Offers 
(IPO) or Seasoned Equity Offers. Higher earnings and increases in earnings signal 
positive information that leads to an overvaluation of the initial offer price. Healy and 
Wahlen (1999, p. 374) explain that some managers use income-increasing accruals to 
“inflate reported earning in an attempt to increase investor’s expectations of future 
performance and increase the offer price”. Singh (2007) also has a similar view and states 
that due to information asymmetry between investors and IPO issuers, the IPO process is 
susceptible to EM. Earlier studies have provided some evidence on this incentive. Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998b) provide evidence on the relationship between EM and 
underperformance of IPOs in the subsequent periods. Issuers with unusually high 
accruals prior to the IPO year experience a decline in stock prices in subsequent years 
reflecting the true financial performance and allowing the capital market to adjust the 
share price. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a) and Rangan (1998) provide similar evidence 
around seasoned equity offering. However, this incentive is less common in inefficient 
markets. 
 
The Quantitative Model 
The two approaches to detect instances of EM employed in this study are the PMDA 
model (quantitative measure) and the MCM (qualitative measure). Although the MJM 
has been identified as a powerful tool for measuring EM (Dechow et al. 1995), it is 
severely misspecified. Performance adjustment enhances the reliability of inferences of 
the traditional EM model (Kothari et al. 2005). Kothari et al. (2005, p. 35) “present 
detailed simulation evidence on the properties of alternative measures of discretionary 
accruals”, and state that “under most circumstances, performance-matched discretionary 
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accruals are well specified and powerful”. Hence, we use PMDA as the quantitative 
measure in this research. 
The PMDA model includes a constant and a performance measure2 in the accruals 
regression (Kothari et al. 2005) unlike the MJM. The PMDA model is as presented 
below: 
 
      (1) 
 where: 
TAit   = total accruals for firm i in year t, 
Ait-1  = net total assets for firm i in year t-1, 
∆REVit  = change in revenue for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
∆ARit   = change in accounts receivable for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
PPEit   = gross property plant and equipment for firm i in year t, 
ROAit   = Return on Assets, 
εit   = error term for firm i in year t. 
 
The model is Total Accruals (TA) (  equals the sum of the Non-discretionary accrual 
(NDAC) component ( ) (which 
includes a constant and a performance measure) and the Discretionary component ( itε ). 
Our focus when detecting EM is on the residual representing DAC that is used by 
management to “cook the books”. The other components are equally important as they 
are used to determine the magnitude and directions of the DAC or EM. 
                                                 
2 Kothari, Leone & Wasley (2005) provide an explanation for the inclusion of the performance measure and 
the constant term in the accruals regression. 
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Jones (1991) explains TA as the change in non-cash working capital less 
depreciation expense. There are two approaches to compute TA, the income approach and 
the balance sheet approach. Since the balance sheet approach has been widely used in 
research,3 it is used in this paper to compute TA. Accordingly it is calculated as follows: 
 
TA = ∆Current Assets – ∆Current Liabilities – ∆Cash + ∆Current Maturities of Long-
Term Debt – Depreciation and Amortisation Expense 
NDAC, a vital component, represents the accruals that cannot be manipulated by 
the managers. The model identifies a number of NDAC components. First, the constant 
term (α) provides control for heteroskedasticity and mitigates problems stemming from 
an omitted size variable (Kothari et al. 2005). Next, the difference between changes in 
revenues and accounts receivable cannot be manipulated. For example, 
 
Account 2010 ($) 2011 ($) Transaction during the year 
Revenue 100 230 1. Cash Sales $40 
Accounts Receivable 50 140 2. Credit Sales $70 
Cash 40 80 3. Credit Sales $20 
 
If we compute ∆REV – ∆AR, we will get: 
         = 130 – 90 
          = 40 
This represents the cash sales that cannot be manipulated easily. 
Gross property, plant and equipment (PPE) is the value of physical assets 
recorded in the balance sheet. The cost or revaluation model could be used to record 
PPE. The cost model was used until recently. Now, due to the introduction of fair value 
accounting, some entities use the revaluation model. The cost model does not allow much 
scope for manipulation as the original cost is recorded. Hence, it is considered a NDAC 
component. However, the use of fair value accounting requires management’s judgments. 
It may not be appropriate to use the current models for firms using the revaluation model 
where PPE could be a discretionary component. 
                                                 
3 Kothari et al. (2005) and Cheng and Reitenga (2009) use the balance sheet approach to compute total 
accruals. 
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Return on Assets (ROA) is included in the model to control for firm performance. 
Kothari et al. (2005, p. 2) explain that “performance and estimated discretionary accruals 
exhibit a mechanical relation”. Lastly, the error term, which is the residual from TA after 
considering NDAC, is the proxy for EM and DAC. Hence, this model is an indirect 
measure. It does not identify items that are considered to be DAC. However, it identifies 
NDAC and calculates the residual from TA. 
 
The Qualitative Model 
The qualitative method, unlike the quantitative models, provides a direct measure to 
detect EM. It attempts to identify all of the discretionary components instead of 
computing it as a residual. Mulford and Comiskey (2002) present checklists to detect 
EM. The four checklists are: detecting premature or fictitious revenue; detecting 
aggressive capitalisation and extended amortisation; detecting misreported assets and 
liabilities; and using operating cash flows to detect EM. These checklists outline 
questions to determine the instances of EM. The following paragraphs (adopted from 
Naidu et al. 2009) briefly describe these checklists.4 
The first checklist, which highlights recognising premature or fictitious revenue, 
is divided into several sections. The first section requires individuals (people identifying 
instances of EM) to understand the entity’s revenue recognition policy. Such 
understanding could be gathered from carefully evaluating the notes section of the 
Annual Report. Also imperative is reviewing the disclosure of related party transactions. 
Thirdly, individuals are required to analyse the physical capacity of the firm to gauge its 
potential to generate the reported revenue. Overstatement or understatement of accounts 
receivable is also considered due to the double entry concept. This means that any 
premature or fictitious revenue would be recorded against an asset account. Hence, other 
asset accounts could also be used, such as prepaid expenses, which are considered in the 
last section. 
The second checklist is divided into two parts: detecting aggressive capitalisation 
policies and detecting aggressive amortisation policies. The first part highlights four 
useful analytical tools: (1) reviewing the entity’s capitalisation policy; (2) carefully 
considering what the capitalised cost represents; (3) checking whether the entity has been 
aggressive in its capitalisation policy in the past; and (4) checking for costs capitalised in 
stealth. Other methods are also considered to be useful such as comparing the 
capitalisation policies with the competitors and the industry. However, competitors could 
also be employing aggressive capitalisation policies. 
The second part of this checklist deals with detecting extended amortisation 
policies. This is done by firstly computing the average amortisation period for a 
company’s depreciable assets, and secondly, checking for extended amortisation periods 
in prior years. 
The third checklist detects any misreported assets and liabilities. This checklist is 
also divided into two parts: detecting overvalued assets and detecting undervalued 
liabilities. The former concentrates on assets like accounts receivable, inventory and 
investments. Assets subject to annual depreciation are considered in the second checklist. 
                                                 
4 A detailed explanation is available in Mulford and Comiskey (2002). 
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Although accounts receivable is examined in the first checklist, this (the third) checklist 
considers the improper valuation of accounts receivable through adjusting entries. 
Entities could manipulate provision for doubtful debts to misreport earnings. 
Inventories can be manipulated by misreporting the physical count, misreporting 
the dollar value without altering the quantity, or postponing transactions. The method 
used to record inventories could also be considered. Internal control procedures are also 
considered in this checklist. The checklist allows investigating investments with a major 
focus on changes in fair value. 
Checklist 3 is also used to gather information on understating liabilities like 
accrued expenses and accounts payable. Trends in accrued expenses could be identified 
and compared with the revenue growth rate. A time series comparison of administrative 
expenses as a percentage of revenue could also be a useful test. Furthermore, accounts 
payables increase due to the credit purchase of inventory. The growth rate of accounts 
payable could be compared against inventory to figure any unusual change. Computing 
the number of accounts payable days is another method to detect any understatement. 
The last checklist uses cash flows from operations to detect EM practices. 
Operating cash flows may not be exclusively helpful but they could be used in 
conjunction with income from continuing operations adjusted for nonrecurring events. 
This checklist requires computing the adjusted cash flow-to-income ratio. This will be 
useful in identifying discernible trends over time. Any unusual change in trends would 
mean that EM practices have been employed. 
On a case-by-case basis, these checklists would identify any unexplained 
behaviour or unusual trends. Analysis will involve explanations for any unusual 
behaviour and any incentives driving this behaviour. Analysis will also depict whether 
generally accepted accounting principles have been followed. 
 
Limitations of MCM 
MCM is a recent development and has not been extensively used in research; thus it lacks 
practical guidance. The qualitative method is subjective to the interpretation of data based 
on the researcher’s ability, whilst both the MJM and PMDA models objectively 
determine the presence and directions of EM. The qualitative approach does not yield the 
magnitude of EM. It only attempts to identify the existence of EM and possibly the 
directions based on the researcher’s interpretations. However, it is difficult to identify the 
extent of EM. 
 
Overlap Between the Two Approaches 
The logic behind the two measures is the same. Both methods identify the same 
variables as discretionary components, thus implying that the same variables are used in 
both measures to detect instances of EM. However, PMDA uses a quantitative approach 
and MCM uses a qualitative approach. For instance, the variables that are used to 
calculate TA are used in the checklists. Net income before extraordinary items and net 
cash flows from operations are used in Checklist 4. Checklist 3 consists of variables such 
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as accounts receivable and accounts payable, which are used in the balance sheet 
approach to calculate TA. Depreciation expenses are used in Checklist 2 
The independent variables in the PMDA model are revenue, receivables and 
property, and plant and equipment. These are also used in the checklists. Revenue is used 
to identify premature and fictitious revenue. Property, plant and equipment are used in 
the checklists to determine the physical capacity of the entity to generate the reported 
revenue. Receivables are used in detecting misreported assets. 
Although the two measures employ the same variables, PMDA is an indirect 
approach and MCM is a direct approach. The PMDA model is concerned about the 
NDAC and computes DAC as a residual representing the instances of EM. The models 
also differ because PMDA only uses financial figures while the other approach is more 
exhaustive. MCM analyses the same variables with all of the other factors that affect the 
variable. For instance, MCM analyses revenue values, revenue recognition policy, credit 
policy, related party transactions and physical capacity to generate the reported revenue. 
The other factors used apart from revenue values make the analysis more effective and 
robust in detecting instances of EM. Thus, the results from computing EM using the two 
measures may not be the same.  This could be due to the comprehensive nature of MCM. 
Moreover, the literature discusses three broad ways that management could 
engage in EM. As discussed earlier, these are classification shifting, real activity 
management and accrual management. On one hand, the PMDA primarily focuses on 
accrual management, and thus as a quantitative model is unable to detect EM through 
classification shifting and real activity management in most cases. On the other hand, 
MCM is a qualitative comprehensive model that incorporates all forms of EM. The 




For the purpose of this research we have used two SOEs (FEA and HA) and two 
private entities (FMF and CFL) to compare the results of MCM and the PMDA model. 
We selected two entities from two different ownership types so that the results of each 
could be compared. The purpose of this comparison is due to the different incentives for 
EM in each of the ownership types. 
It is difficult to obtain financial data for most entities due to the lack of mandatory 
requirements on the publication of annual reports unless the entity is listed on the stock 
exchange. Most entities were listed on the South Pacific Stock Exchange (SPSE) after 
2002; however FMF and CFL were listed in 1979 and 2001 respectively. The annual 
reports for CFL are publicly available since 1998. Hence, FMF and CFL are selected. 
FEA and HA are statutory organisations and their financial reports are publicly available 
for all years. For FMF and CFL, we obtained data from 1998 to 2009. For consistency, 
we used the same period data for FEA and HA. 
 




As discussed earlier, this paper uses the PMDA model as the quantitative approach and 
MCM as the qualitative approach to detect EM. First, suspicious events that indicate an 
instance of EM are identified from the annual reports of each company. Then, EM 
incentives within the firm are identified. Based on the event, and the identified incentives, 
the direction of EM as per MCM is established. The PMDA model is later used to 
compute DAC for the sample firms for the sample years. This result is then compared 
with the MCM results. 
While comparing the results, we consider the direction of EM, either income-
increasing or income-decreasing for the respective years. This paper provides a year-by-
year comparison of the directions of EM between the two measures. Direction of EM 
using the DAC is determined by the quantitative calculation using the PMDA model, and 




Table 1 provides a summary of EM evidence in the SOEs. Panel A presents results for 
FEA and Panel B the results for HA. It describes the incentives for EM and the approach 
used to practice EM for the respective years considered. It considers approaches like 
changes in depreciation rates, changes in provision for doubtful debts, provisions written 
back, extraordinary items such as losses arising from write off, and classifications of 
items like security expenditures. Similarly, Table 2 provides a summary of EM evidence 





Summary of Earnings Management Evidence in State-owned Enterprises 
 
Panel A (Fiji Electricity Authority – FEA) 
Year Event Incentive 
1998 Increase in provision for doubtful debts and reversal of gain on disposal of assets To show difficulties and persuade for tax exempt status 
1999 Adopted high depreciation rates. Extraordinary item: losses arising from the write-off To make a case to the government to extend the tax exempt status and reimburse the cost of universal service obligations 
2000 Abnormal item: costs related to civil unrest and security related expenditures. Postponed significant revenue to next period with decrease in accruals  To attract concessions and government grants 
2001 Revenue improved with increase in accounts receivables. Adopted high depreciation rates 
2002 Significant increase in provision for retirement benefit To attain duty concession and attractgGovernment grants 
2003 Postponed significant revenue to the following period. There was high capacity to generate revenue as its proportion to lag total assets was increasing To attain government grants 
2004 Adopted low depreciation rates To attain financial performance indicators within Statement of Corporate Intent 
2005 Adopted high depreciation rates and provision for doubtful debts To attain duty concession of diesel fuel 
2006 Provision for doubtful debts written back. Decline in provision for doubtful debts To meet debt covenant. To meet Corporate Intent requirements (Return on Shareholders 
Fund) 2007 Provision and VAT liability written back and costs written off. Grants amortised and classified as other income 
2008 Adopted high depreciation rates. Grants amortised and classified as other income To meet debt covenant. To meet Corporate Intent requirements. To relay message that it needs duty concessions 
2009 Significant unrealised foreign exchange loss treated as ordinary income. The company still made a good profit To meet Corporate Intent requirements. To relay message that it needs duty concessions 
 
 
Panel B (Housing Authority – HA) 
1998 Abnormal income item classified within operating income To beat budget projections and attract government grants 
1999 Increase in provision for doubtful debts. Stock write-downs. Change in policy resulted in decrease in interest income Converting debt into equity 
2000 Decrease in provision for doubtful debts. Abnormal items: government grants received 
included part of operating income 
To attain government guarantee on housing bonds 
2001 To attract government’s decision to favour debt to equity conversion 
2002 Reversal of accruals and provision for repairs classified as operating income To attain the conversion of debt to equity 
2003 Decrease in provision for doubtful debts. Reversal of accruals To provide improved performance upon restructure and the replacement of Chief Executive Officer 
2004 Increase in revenue relative to capacity measured using lag total assets. Reversal of accruals To beat budget projections targeted return on equity 
2005 Increase in provision for doubtful debts To achieve stretched profit budget projections 
2006 Significant increase in other current assets; significant decline in provision for doubtful debts To provide return of 10% on Shareholders Fund 
2007 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts. Increase in short term employee benefits To attract government grants 
2008 Decrease in revenue relative to capacity measured using lag total assets To attract government grants 
2009 Significant increase in accounts receivable and revenue relative to capacity To attract government grants. This was subsequently provided 





Summary of Earnings Management Evidence in Private Entities 
 
Panel A (Flour Mills of Fiji – FMF) 
1998 Adopted high depreciation rates Specific incentive could not be identified with limited information in annual report 
1999 Increase in provision for doubtful debts 
To draw attention to the impact of significant reduction in import protection 2000 Large decline in debtors and other receivables while provision for doubtful debts was high 
2001 Large increase in debtors and other receivables while growth of operating capacity decreased Specific incentive could not be identified with limited information in annual report 
2002 Adopted low depreciation rates Import protection was granted, hence positive results shown 
2003 Decline in provision for doubtful debts A new Chief Financial Officer was appointed who could have incentive to show positive results 
2004 Adopted high depreciation rates To smooth earnings due to significant increase in revenue 
2005 Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts To provide positive results to the market despite the introduction of a competitor 
2006 Further decline in provision for doubtful debts and change in amortisation policy A new Chief Financial Officer was appointed who could have incentive to show positive results 
2007 Increase in provision for doubtful debts To draw attention to the impact of the Price and Income Board's decision against the 
company 2008 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts 
2009 Decline in provision for doubtful debts To avoid significant decline in operating profit 
 
 
 Panel B (Communications Fiji Limited – CFL)  
1998 Significant increase in other receivables and decline in provision for doubtful debts Specific incentives could not be identified. Broadly to meet debt covenants 
1999 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts and increase in depreciation charge Specific incentives could not be identified. Probably for tax savings 
2000 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts 
2001 Significant decline in other receivables and adopted low depreciation rates To attract an application for an Initial Public Offer 
2002 Significant decline in provision for repairs and maintenance and annual leave To provide positive information to the market after being listed and to approach targeted earnings in the Prospectus 
2003 Increase in revenue while debtors and other receivables declined To provide positive information to the market after being listed and to exceed targeted earnings in the Prospectus 
2004 Significant increase in other receivables while revenue remained stagnant To maintain earnings growth. Specific incentives could not be identified 
2005 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts. Significant loss on impairment Specific incentives could not be identified. To smoothen the earnings trend over time 
2006 Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts To avoid loss as income from operations was significantly reduced 
2007 Adopted high depreciation rates To induce a temporary decline in share prices as an employee-share incentive plan was introduced 
2008 Significant decline in provision for doubtful debts To maximise compensation as per the employee-share incentive plan 
2009 Significant increase in provision for doubtful debts Specific incentives could not be identified. To smoothen the growth in earnings trend. 
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Earnings Management Events in SOEs and Private Entities 
Broadly, the approaches used for EM by SOEs and private entities differ. The selected 
private entities have used only a few events to engage in EM, mostly the use of accruals 
(accounts and other receivables), provision for doubtful debts and changes in depreciation 
policies. On the other hand, the SOEs have used many ways to engage in EM. Including 
the techniques used by private entities, SOEs have also used abnormal items, reversal of 
gains from disposal of fixed assets, provision for retirement benefits, liability write-
backs, stock write-down, unrealised foreign exchange loss and reversal of accruals. 
The use of different events for SOEs can be mainly attributed to the differences in 
the incentives to engage in EM for each ownership type. Also, SOEs and private entities 
have different operating purposes. The former has the goal of providing service with the 
minimum possible cost while the latter has the aim of maximising profits. 
 
PMDA Results 
Table 3 presents the results computed using the PMDA model as well as comparing the 
MCM results for the respective years for SOEs. Panel A displays the DAC and its 
comparison for FEA. Panel B provides the same for HA. The direction of EM is the same 
in 7 instances out of 12 for both SOEs. The two models provide different results in 
approximately 42% instances. 
Table 3 
Comparative Results for the PMDA model and MCM for State-owned Enterprises 
 
Panel A (Fiji Electricity Authority – FEA) 
Year DAC Directions as per MCM Comparisons 
1998 -0.0182 income – decreasing  Same 
1999 -0.0031 income – decreasing  Same 
2000 -0.1853 income – decreasing  Same 
2001 -0.0127 income – decreasing  Same 
2002 -0.0631 income – decreasing  Same 
2003 -0.0130 income – decreasing  Same 
2004 -0.1205 income – increasing Different 
2005 -0.0476 income – decreasing  Same 
2006 -0.0145 income – increasing Different 
2007 -0.0095 income – increasing Different 
2008 -0.0356 income – decreasing / income  – increasing Different 
2009 0.0583 income – decreasing Different 
        
Panel B (Housing Authority – HA) 
1998 8.6823 income – increasing Same 
1999 -8.9903 income – decreasing Same 
2000 3.2524 income – increasing Same 
2001 6.4364 income – increasing Same 
2002 -3.6792 income – increasing Different 
2003 -1.3147 income – increasing Different 
2004 -0.5101 income – increasing Different 
2005 -1.6808 income – decreasing Same 
2006 -0.7991 income – increasing Different 
2007 -1.3212 income – decreasing Same 
2008 -1.1223 income – decreasing Same 
2009 -0.3003 income – increasing Different 




Table 4 compares the results from the two models for the private entities, FMF in 
Panel A and CFL in Panel B. The direction of EM is same in 6 instances for FMF and 10 
instances for CFL out of a total of 12. On average the results are different in fewer 
instances for private entities than SOEs. The following paragraphs discuss possible 




Comparative Results for the PMDA model and MCM for Private Entities 
 
Panel A (Flour Mills of Fiji – FMF) 
1998 -0.3291 income – decreasing Same 
1999 -0.2087 income – decreasing Same 
2000 0.0200 income – decreasing Different 
2001 0.1081 income – increasing Same 
2002 -0.1171 income – increasing Different 
2003 -0.0098 income – increasing Different 
2004 -0.0474 income – decreasing Same 
2005 0.0316 income – increasing Same 
2006 -0.2107 income – increasing Different 
2007 -0.3029 income – decreasing Same 
2008 0.7214 income – decreasing Different 
2009 -0.2866 income – increasing Different 
    
 
    
Panel B (Communications Fiji Limited – CFL) 
1998 0.0364 income – increasing Same 
1999 0.0145 income – decreasing Different 
2000 -0.0602 income – decreasing Same 
2001 0.1211 income – increasing Same 
2002 0.0020 income – increasing Same 
2003 0.0613 income – increasing Same 
2004 0.0115 income – increasing Same 
2005 -0.0121 income – decreasing Same 
2006 -0.0193 income – increasing Different 
2007 -0.0130 income – decreasing Same 
2008 0.0348 income – increasing Same 
2009 -0.0779 income – decreasing Same 
 
Foundations for Inconsistency between MCM and the PMDA model 
The results of the two measures of EM differ due to the different perspective adopted in 
developing each model, namely the ontological and epistemological views. The 
epistemological explanation takes a broader view and incorporates alternative approaches 
in acquiring knowledge. This is more aligned with the qualitative measure that 
incorporates most ways in which one could engage in EM. The ontological perspective 
involves a construction process similar to the empirical modelling of accrual 
management. The knowledge acquired through this process may not be absolutely true. 
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EM is achieved through various means including the use of accruals, changes in 
accounting methods, and policies and changes in capital structure like debt defeasance or 
debt-equity swaps (Jones 1991). Similarly Ronen and Sadan (1975a, 1975b) explain that 
EM is conducted using approaches such as classification shifting, real activity 
management and accrual management. While scrutinising EM using MCM, most of the 
possibilities to conduct EM are considered. The checklists discussed in this study 
demonstrate that MCM incorporates most of the techniques of committing EM. However, 
the PMDA model detects instances of EM that are mainly committed through accrual 
management. This is a major drawback of the quantitative measure and also a rationale 
that leads to the differences in the results produced by the two models. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the events that are captured by the quantitative 
model. The following events are captured in the PMDA model: adoption of high tax 
depreciation rates; changes in depreciation rates; provision for doubtful debts; provision 
for retirement plans; provision for write-down of inventory; reversal of gain from 
disposal of fixed assets; and the use of accruals. Since the quantitative model captures 
these events, it can produce the same outcome as the qualitative measure for the years 
that these events have been used to manage earnings. However, for other years the 




Summary of Common Events and Similar Ability of the Two Approaches to Detect Earnings 
Management Arising From the Respective Events 
 
Event PMDA model and MCM have same result 
Abnormal items Yes 
Adopted high depreciation rates Yes 
Adopted lower depreciation rates No 
Change in amortisation policy No 
Liability write-back No 
Provision for doubtful debts Yes 
Provision for retirement plan Yes 
Provision for write-down of inventory Yes 
Reversal of accruals No 
Reversal of gain from disposal of assets Yes 
The use of accruals Yes 
Unrealised foreign exchange loss  No 
 
The PMDA model tends to ignore other important factors that lead to EM. These 
factors include changes in accounting policies such as revenue recognition policies, credit 
policies, EM through classification shifting and the use of real business activities. For 
example, FEA ceased to capitalise certain overheads to property, plant and equipment 
and the revaluation of non-current assets. This is a major limitation of using the 
quantitative models and further research is required to further develop the model. 
However, this inconsistency does not imply that one model is superior to the other. 
 




We employ the PMDA model (quantitative) and MCM (qualitative) to compare EM in 
two SOEs and two private entities. We find that the measurement of EM across both 
models is not consistent. The differences are explained using the ontological and 
epistemological views of acquiring knowledge. This is related to the three broad ways in 
which management can engage in EM, which are are classification shifting, real activity 
management and accrual management. While the PMDA model is specifically for accrual 
management, the qualitative approach generally incorporates all three categories. 
This paper also attempts to identify some limitations of each method discussed. 
Even though the qualitative measure is a comprehensive approach, it does not compute 
the magnitude of EM and is also very subjective. Moreover, one may not be able to 
identify all instances of EM using either approach. In addition, it is time-consuming to 
evaluate individual annual reports and more difficult in countries where disclosure is 
inadequate and business management is hesitant in providing information. 
On the other hand, the PMDA model objectively determines the presence of EM 
and could be reliably used in empirical research. The accrual model has gone through a 
number of revisions and Kothari et al. (2005) provide a powerful test. However, this 
model does not incorporate the qualitative factors. It is developed to detect EM conducted 
through accrual management, and in most cases it may not detect EM through 
classification shifting and real activity management. Researchers have also discussed the 
expectations model for real activity management. Hence, future research could 
incorporate the ideas from each form of EM and further develop the quantitative measure. 
The use of only four selected companies is a major limitation of this study. This 
idea requires further exploration using more data so that the results could be validated. 
The results identify the events being captured by the quantitative model and indicate that 
more research is required to incorporate other events in the quantitative model. Mulford 
and Comiskey (2002) provide a good guide for future research to enhance the ability of 
the quantitative models to detect EM. 
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